In 2012, the Department of Housing and Urban Development launched the fourth major nationwide housing discrimination study with the goal of measuring housing discrimination in rental and owner-occupied housing for blacks, Hispanics and Asians. The substantial declines in discrimination observed between 1989 and 2000 lead to a considerable debate about whether paired testing studies of the type conducted in 2000 understate the extent of housing discrimination. Using the 2012 study and earlier evidence, this paper considers three of the significant concerns about paired testing studies of housing discrimination: 1. exclusion of minorities during the process of setting up appointments, 2. the net measure of adverse treatment understating discrimination because some housing units are systematically not shown to white testers, and 3. the use of metropolitan wide advertisements for conducting tests may systematically miss neighborhoods where discrimination is higher. The 2012 study directly addresses the first concern finding at most very low levels of discrimination in obtaining an appointment over the phone. The evidence for the second concern is mixed. The levels of equal treatment in 2012 in terms of basic access were quite high leaving little room for the systematic exclusion of white under some circumstances, while steering persisted against both blacks and Asians in owner-occupied housing. Nonetheless, estimates of steering were modest, and the gross levels of adverse treatment are far too large to be explained by the steering observed in 2012. In order to address the third concern, this paper conducts a new empirical analysis in which we measure the availability of rental and owner-occupied housing in each broad neighborhood represented in the 2012 Housing Discrimination Study, and reweight the tests to represent the spatial availability of housing across each metropolitan site rather than the distribution of advertisements. While the reweighting substantially changed the weights on individual tests, the average attributes of the neighborhoods represented by those tests experienced only modest changes from reweighting, and the estimated measures of adverse treatment were unchanged.
of adverse treatment where one of the three concerns is that the net measure may understate discrimination relative to the gross measure. In the main body of the paper, we first present the basic estimates of treatment patterns from the 2012 HDS rental tests using the traditional weights and then later present the sales test results. The 2012 study directly addresses the first concern in that the ability to make an appointment over the phone is tracked and measures of adverse treatment are developed based on this outcome. In rental markets, no differences are observed in the frequency of white favored and minority favored tests (net measure) on the ability to make an appointment for any group. In sales markets, significant differences are observed for black-white tests in the ability to make an appointment, but the maximum possible effect of this difference on the net measure for other outcomes is modest and no differences were observe for Hispanics or Asians (Turner, Santos, Levy, Wissoker, Aranda, Pitingolo 2013) . The study findings suggest that the inability of minority testers to obtain an appointment is not a major source of bias in measuring housing discrimination.
The evidence on the second question, bias in the net measure, is mixed, but in our opinion tends to support the use of the net measure. The 2012 study found at most small net differences in the likelihood of rental or owneroccupied housing being available for all three groups, and the likelihood of equal treatment was quite high for both obtaining an appointment and the availability of housing. Therefore, for obtaining an appointment and in the case of rental housing for availability there was virtually no room for any systematic favoring of minority testers due to the high rate of equal treatment. The 2012 study found larger net differences in the likelihood of the white versus the minority tester having either more units available or inspecting more units for all three groups in the rental tests and for blacks and Asians in the sales tests. Further, on these measures, there is substantial room for differences between the net and gross measures, especially in sales tests where the gross measure is often 30 to 40 percentage points higher than the net measures.
Turning to earlier studies to further address the second question, Ondrich, Ross and Yinger (2000) using data from 1989 found direct evidence that whites are sometimes systematically favored, but only for one of many measures of treatment considered. The 2000 study found evidence that steering against blacks increased between 4 similar in magnitude (Turner, Santos, Levy, Wissoker, Aranda, Pitingolo 2013) , but the incidence of steering in all cases was far too small to explain the large observed differences between net and gross measures for number of units available or number of units inspected. Finally, a pilot study of triad tests was conducted in two sites in 2002 so that randomness could be assessed by comparing same race pairs, and that pilot study did not find any evidence that the net measure understated discrimination (Turner and Ross 2003b) .
The final argument for why paired testing studies of this type understate discrimination is that they are forced to rely on publically available, market wide advertisements either in the newspaper or on the internet. One important caveat to this concern is that the 2012 study weighted the probability of advertisement selection to match the stock of rental and owner-occupied housing, and so such bias cannot be driven solely by low advertisement volume in some neighborhoods relative to the stock of housing. At present, little direct evidence exists on this last question. The one exception is a limited sampling of alternative neighborhood level advertisements in the larger sites of the 2000 HDS (Turner and Ross 2003b) . The level of adverse treatment in the alternative sample of black-white rental tests was not systematically higher than the traditional newspaper sampling based estimates in 2000, but the alternative sample of black-white sales tests did exhibit substantially higher levels of adverse treatment on the availability and inspection of units.
In order to address this final concern, we use data from the 2011 American Community Survey to identify new residents in rental (owner-occupied) housing within the last year as evidence that a rental (owner-occupied) housing unit turned over and was available for rent (sale) during that year. Using this proxy for available rental or owner-occupied housing, we estimate the number of available, rental and owner-occupied housing units in each Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMA) in each metropolitan site for the 2012 HDS. For both rental and sales tests, we compare these shares to the shares of tests for each PUMA in each site, and then develop new weights that give higher weights to tests in PUMAs with more available rental housing in order to develop measures of adverse treatment that are representative of treatment in the sample of available housing units, as opposed to the sample of advertised units. We conduct this analysis for white-black, Anglo-Hispanics and white-Asian rental tests over the seven main measures of adverse treatment in the rental market and for four key measures for the owner-occupied market that were presented in the HDS 2012 study.
This exercise implicitly assumes that if the measures of discrimination are biased by the use of the advertisement as the market entry point then this bias arises because the sampled advertisements do not accurately represent the spatial distribution of available housing. In that case, our proposed reweight would increase the weight on those underrepresented neighborhoods where discrimination might be higher. However, if discriminatory providers are simply much less likely to advertise their housing units in traditional media outlets, then this exercise cannot capture such bias because the discriminatory landlords are simply never observed in the sample and the behavior of the landlords observed in the underrepresentated neighborhoods cannot stand in for the landlords who are not observed. Given the evidence from the 2000 HDS on alternative portals, this concern is likely more significant for sales than rental housing markets.
The analysis of adverse treatment based on the location of available rental and owner-occupied housing suggests that measures of discrimination in the rental market are unaffected by the reliance of public advertisements to sample rental and owner-occupied housing units. There is virtually no difference between the measures of adverse treatment using the standard metropolitan weights and measures using weights designed to capture adverse treatment for a sample of available units for any measure or any group. The descriptive statistics suggest that the weights vary dramatically across PUMAs and within metropolitan sites. However, we also measure the average neighborhood characteristics of the metropolitan site using census tract measures of average housing price, median income, share black, share Hispanic and share owner-occupied using both the site weights and the new weights that vary within site. Again, across the six samples and the many neighborhood variables, we find very little differences for rental and modest differences for sales tests between the average census tract attributes. Our conclusion is that while advertisements weighted by housing stock do not perfectly capture the population of available units the differences in the spatial distribution between advertised and available units appear to be relatively random.
Methods
The 2010 Housing Discrimination Study (HDS) examines housing discrimination within a sample of metropolitan areas through the lens of the available housing that appears in paid, metropolitan wide advertisements, in the case of the 2012 HDS the rental advertisements appear online in Craigslist, apartments.com, rent.com and similar websites, while for sales the advertisements were drawn from sites like zillow.com. Tests were based on advertisements that were selected with probabilities based on the stock of available housing in each market. In this section, we describe our approach for reweighting the data to represent the population of available housing during the year of the study, rather than the stock of housing during the period immediately preceding the tests. The original weights for examining the result of the 2012 HDS were created to address the sampling of metropolitan areas from all U.S. metropolitan areas. Specifically, U.S. metropolitan areas were divided into strata based on minority representation. Metropolitan areas with the largest minority representation were selected with certainty, and then a set number of metropolitan areas were randomly selected from each of the remaining strata to represent all areas in that strata. Each test i in each metropolitan area s is then assigned a weight so equal to the inverse of the selection probability (ܲ ௦ ) times the inverse of the number of tests in the site
so that each metropolitan area has a total weight over all tests equal to the inverse of the selection probability.
Note that the selection probability for a site is proportional to the site's share of the minority group being tested in that particular strata.
Our weights are be designed to leave the total weight associated with a site unchanged, but to allow tests that must represent a larger number of available units geographically to have higher weights. Specifically, we exploit a lower level of geography within each metropolitan area, Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA), and create a weight by dividing the number of tests in a PUMA p (݊ ௦ ) by the number of estimated unit available units in p (ܽ ௦ ) and then scaling the weight so that the total weight associated with a metropolitan area is unchanged.
Specifically, the new weight is described by
where the first term in the expression is the original weight associated with the metropolitan area, the second term is the ratio of number of tests to number of available units in a PUMA, and the third term simply the sum of the second term over all tests in a metropolitan area or
The logic behind this equation is as follows 1. Each test receives a weight based on its PUMA which is the ratio of number of available units divided by number of tests.
2. This ratio is divided by the sum of the ratio over all tests in the site so that the sum of weights for each site is one.
3. The resulting number is that multiplied by the original weight assigned to each site, one over the probability of selection.
Adverse treatment is then defined using the traditional net measure
for continuous measures of treatment where ‫ݎܨ‬ is the empirical frequency and both the means and the frequency are weighted based on ܹ ෩ ௦ .
Data
Our analysis begins with the data arising from the 2012 Housing Discrimination Study. As noted earlier, the 2012 HDS begins by selecting a sample of sites from specific strata. The details of site selection can be found in Turner, Santos, Levy, Wissoker, Aranda, and Pitingolo (2013) . Table 1 presents the selected sites by their units in each PUMA, and so provide a quite accurate indication of the relative turnover in each location. The number of tests in each site provide a perfect indication of the number of observations in each location. Therefore, the weights provide a very accurate mapping from the information generated by the tests in each site and for each group to a population of available rental housing units with only one exception. Therefore, the implication of the small number of tests is not about bias, but rather that the reweighting corrects for two problems: 1. the potential systematic undersampling of PUMAs relative to the amount of available rental housing, and 2. the random spatial noise added to the 2012 HDS measures due to the relatively sparse number of tests across the various subregions of each site.
The one exception that creates bias in these measures is that some PUMAs in large MSAs may have no tests and so those PUMAs must be ignored in any measure of adverse treatment. Of course, discrimination in those PUMA's was also omitted by definition from the traditional estimates. Table 3 presents the total number of tests for each site by rental (column 1) and by sales (column 3), as well as the number of tests used in calculating specific treatment variables. Specifically, a majority of the treatments considered in the sales tests are only observed if both testers make it relatively far into the process, which happens more frequently for rental tests. For example, whether the advertised unit is inspected conditional on units being available is an important treatment variable that is observed for approximately 85 percent of rental tests, but only between 60 and 70 percent of sales tests. Finally, the second and fourth column show the share of PUMAs for each set of treatments that can be included in the revised measures of adverse treatment because at least one test reached this stage of the process in that PUMA. For white-black and Anglo-Hispanic rental tests, the samples of tests always cover at least 70% of the PUMA's in the sample of sites. The initial percentage for white-Asian rental tests is smaller at 60%, but never falls below 55%. For sales tests, weights provide coverage over less than 50% of the PUMAs for many of the treatment variables. Therefore, we only conduct this exercise for the four treatment indicators from the sales tests that are calculated for either the entire sample of tests or the sample of tests where both testers were able to meet with an agent. For these four treatments, at least 50 percent of the PUMAs have tests in all samples.
Results
Tables 4 through 6 present the rental market estimates of adverse treatment of black, Hispanic and Asian testers, respectively, relative to their white counterparts. The first panel of each table presents the estimates that are nationally representative of advertisements, and the second panel presents the estimates reweighted to represent the availability of rental housing throughout each site. The rows in each panel represent the key treatment variables beginning with whether testers were able to make an appointment. If both testers were able to make an appointment, the following treatment variables are considered: whether tester told any units available, whether tester told about more available units than other tester, and number of units available. If both testers learn about available units, the final set of treatment variables examined are average rent, whether one tester inspected more units than the other, and number of units inspected. The first column identifies the fraction of tests where either both testers received favorable treatment or learned about or saw the same number of units. The next two columns identify the fraction of tests where either the majority or minority tester was treated favorably, and the fourth column presents the differences in those two columns, or the net measure of adverse treatment. The final columns present the confidence with which the net measure can be reported as differing from zero indicating evidence of discrimination.
First, there are no significant differences for any minority group in the likelihood of obtaining an appointment, which is significant because this treatment was not captured in 2000 and inability to obtain an appointment has long been considered a potential source of bias in the earlier housing discrimination studies. The differences for rental tests shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6 are always less than 0.5 percent and never significant. The next important observation to draw from the first panels in Tables 4, 5 and 6 is that there continues to be moderate improvements in the number of testers receiving equal treatment in the rental market. The share of tests in which both testers obtained an appointment and if an appointment was obtained the share of tests for which rental housing is available to both testers is always around 95%, which leaves very little room for differential treatment of any kind and so it is unlikely that net measures are understated because minorities are sometimes systematically favored. This represents substantial improvements for blacks and Hispanics in the likelihood of equal treatment relative to the 2000. In 2000, 20 percent of white-black tests had differences between testers in the availability of the advertised unit and almost 30 percent of white black tests had differences in the availability of similar units, and for Anglo-Hispanic tests, the share of tests with differences were 17 and 24 percent of tests for advertised and similar units, respectively (Ross and Turner 2008) . For Asian tests, the percent of tests with differences in 2000 were 15 and 22 percent of tests. While the incidence of equal is treatment is not as high on the number of units available or inspected, blacks and Hispanics still show notable improvements with blacks' frequency of equal treatment on number of units available and inspected rising from 49 to 54 and from 60 to 69, respectively and Hispanics' frequency rising from 50 to 65 and from 66 to 69.
Nonetheless, significant levels of discrimination remain for all three groups. Minority testers are more likely to be told about less available units or to inspect less units then their white counterparts with net differences of 9.0, 12.8, and 8.8 percentage point differences in being told about less available units for blacks, Hispanics and Asians, and net differences of 2.8, 6.0, and 5.5 percentage point differences in inspecting less available units.
These compare to differences in number of available units in 2000 of 6.2, 8.9, and 3.9 for blacks, Hispanics and Asians, respectively, and differences on inspected units of 6.8, 6.1, and -4.8 (Asian favored). Therefore, even if all testers had equal access to appointments and at least one unit of available housing, observed discrimination in the rental market are somewhat higher in terms of the number of housing units available for the tester to consider.
Finally, in 2012, blacks and Hispanics are quoted slightly higher rents than their white counterparts on average by between 4 and 6 dollars per month.
Turning to the calculations in the second panel of Tables 4 through 6, it quickly becomes clear that there are virtually no systematic difference between the estimates using the original weights and the results using weights based on within metropolitan turnover or the availability of rental housing. For example, the net measure for which tester was told about more available units rises from 9.0 to 9.4, falls from 12.8 to 12.7, and falls from 8.8 to 7.1 for black, Hispanic and Asian testers, respectively. For being shown more units, the net measure falls from 2.8 to 1.2, rises from 6.0 to 6.4 and falls from 5.5 to 4.7 for these three groups. All of these changes are relatively small and many of these changes are very small. Only one result that is statistically significant in panel single change could easily be explained by type 1 error given the large number of comparisons being made. There is certainly no evidence that PUMAs that were undertested relative to the amount of available rental housing have systematically higher levels of adverse treatment against minorities who are seeking rental housing.
Tables 7 through 9 present the sales market estimates of adverse treatment of black, Hispanic and Asian testers, respectively. As above, the top panel of each table presents the traditional estimates, and the bottom panel presents the reweighted estimates. The first rows in each panel present estimates for whether testers were able to make an appointment. If both testers were able to make an appointment, the following treatment variables are considered: whether tester told any units available, whether tester told about more available units than other tester, and number of units available. In order, the columns present the fraction of tests where either both testers received favorable treatment or learned about or saw the same number of units, the fraction of tests where either the majority or minority tester was treated favorably, and the differences in those two columns.
As in the rental market, differences in the likelihood of obtaining an appointment could have had at most very small impacts on the measured incidence of discrimination on other treatments. For white-black tests, the net measure for obtaining an appointment is 2.4 percent and statistically significant, but even if all of these landlords discriminated on the key variables like being told about more homes (net of 12.4 percent) or inspecting more homes (net of 9.3 percent) this would imply at most very modest increases in the measured incidence of discrimination on white-black sales tests. The net differences in obtaining an appointment are substantially smaller and statistically insignificant for the Anglo-Hispanic and white-Asian sales tests. The incidence of equal treatment is significantly lower, below 85 percent for all three groups, in the sales market as compared to the rental market, but comparable to levels in 2000. Therefore, in this market, there is more room for gross differences in adverse treatment. The net differences in adverse treatment on availability and number of units are typically insignificant. Net differences in whether the tester saw at least one unit are insignificant for all three groups, and net differences in whether the white tester saw more units is only significant for the black-white tests. It is notable that the magnitude of the black white differences is substantially larger in 2012 jumping to 13.4 percent of tests as compared to 5.3 percent of tests in 2000. While not shown in the tables, net differences also exist for blacks and Asians in terms of inspecting more units, 9.3 and 13.9 percent respectively, and being steered away from whiter neighborhoods, 5.0 and 5.9 percent. These differences are comparable to differences observed for blacks in 2000.
Turning to the calculations in the second panel of Tables 7 through 9 , we again find virtually no systematic difference between the estimates using the original weights and the results using the revised weights. The net measures for appointment and having a unit available for the three samples remain consistently small. The net measure for which tester was told about more available units rises from 13.5 to 14.1, rises from 2.3 to 2.4, and rises from 9.2 to 11.3 for black, Hispanic and Asian testers, respectively. Only the change for Asians is appreciable in magnitude, and those estimates are very noisy and statistically insignificant even though the point estimate of net adverse treatment is around 10 percent.
Why Are the Estimates Unaffected by Reweighting
The distribution of weights is illustrated by presenting the distribution of new weights divided by the old weights. Since the old weights are constant for all tests in a metropolitan area, this ratio illustrates the level of variation in weights within each site. The results for rental and owner-occupied housing are shown in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. The three panels present the distribution of the within metropolitan area weights for each of the three groups, in order white-black, Anglo-Hispanic and white-Asian tests. The rows in each panel represent the weights for various subsamples since the number of tests vary across the treatment variables and as a result the weights vary across the variables. The first row is the full sample for which we observe whether testers were able to meet with an agent, the second row is the subsample where both testers were able to meet with an agent and we observe the availability of units, and the third (rental only) is the subsample where units are available for both testers and we learn about treatments such as rent and ability to inspect a unit. The columns present in order the minimum, the 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and the maximum ratio. All sets of weight in both tables exhibit substantial variation with the 75th percentile weights being more than double the 25th percentile weights (almost three times for sales tests), and so the weights contributed substantial information that could have led to large changes in the measures of adverse treatment. For all groups, the weights are skewed towards a small number of tests with relatively large weights. This raises some concerns about results being driven by outliers, but the largest weights are never much more than 10 and the tests with the largest weights never represent much more than 1 to 2 percent of the sample by weight (less than 1 percent for rental tests).
Tables 12 and 13 attempt to shed further light on why the effects of the weights are so small. The first panel of each table presents the average of several key census tract variables over all tests using both the original weights and the weights based on turnover or availability, and the second panel presents the ratio of the averages based on the original and revised weights. Each subpanel shows the averages for the total sample of tests, the subsample where both testers had an appointment and in the case of rental housing in Table 12 the subsample where both testers were told units were available. The five tract attributes considered are median income, median housing value, share black, share Hispanic and share households that are owner-occupants. For rental housing in Table 12 , the differences in tract exposure are relatively modest for all variables considered, and the ratio's of the tract exposure means are usually less than 3 percent and never more than 6 percent away from 1. While there is considerable variation within sites in the weights, the variation is relatively random as captured by the attributes of the neighborhoods in which the tests are located. As a result, even if there is systematic variation in treatment within each site, the tests that were randomly selected based on advertisements and housing stock and so provide an accurate picture of the average level of discrimination.
On the other hand, for owner-occupied housing in Table 13 , the effect on neighborhood attributes is more substantial. Reweighting raises average median income of the census tracts by between 4 and 10 percent, and decreases average percent black by between 11 and 19 percent. The largest changes arise for the Anglo-Hispanic tests sample. Looking back at Tables 7, 8 , and 9, the changes in the net measure are somewhat larger for the owner-occupied sample than for the rental sample, but still modest and non-systematic with some measures of adverse treatment increasing and other decreasing. Even with the larger changes from reweighting in the neighborhood composition in which sales tests took place, we find no evidence of a systematic bias away from detecting discrimination against minority homebuyers.
Conclusion
This paper discusses the three major concerns that have been raised about paired testing studies by individuals who worry that these studies understate the level of discrimination. The first concern that rental and sales agents who intend to discriminate will filter out minorities during initial phone calls has been addressed directly by the 2012 HDS. This recent study found no differences for rental tests and only small black-white differences for sales tests in the likelihood of obtaining an appointment with both testers obtaining an appointment in the vast majority of cases. As a result, exclusion at the appointment stage could have at most only a very modest effect on estimates of discrimination at later stages of the tests. The second concern is that net measures of adverse treatment understates discrimination because some cases of favorable treatment of minorities might arise from discriminatory behavior. The continued evidence of steering in the sales market supports these concerns, but the incidence of steering is quite small, typically 5 percent or less, relative to the differences between net and gross adverse treatment on measures like having more available housing or inspecting more housing units, differences that were typically above 30 percent for sales tests in 2012. Further, the only direct evidence on this question, the use of triad tests in the 2000 HDS, found no evidence of bias in the net measure.
The final concern discussed is that the sampling of housing units from metropolitan wide advertisement sources may miss or under represent housing units or neighborhoods where discrimination is especially high. If landlords or real estate agents who intend to discriminate simply do not advertise housing in metropolitan wide sources, then such discrimination cannot be detected using the information from paired tests based on such metropolitan wide sources, and as discussed earlier evidence from the 2000 HDS on housing units advertised in non-traditional sources suggest that this might be a concern for the sales market. However, if discrimination is higher in regions or neighborhoods of the metropolitan area that are underrepresented during paired testing, the data from paired testing studies with sufficient numbers of tests in each site can be reweighted to represent the average level of adverse treatment for the available housing in each site. This paper has conducted this reweighting, but finds little evidence of any systematic under representation of certain neighborhoods in each metropolitan area and no evidence of bias in the measures of adverse treatment.
Finally, for rental housing, it is important to acknowledge that paired testing studies cannot detect adverse treatment that arises much later in the rental process. For example, a landlord may treat all potential tenants the same up until accepting a formal application and running a credit check on applicants, but then only rent to white applications. Such behavior might be a rational response of discriminatory landlords in the face of federally and locally funding fair housing enforcement actions. In fact, Galster and Ross (2007) find that rental discrimination against blacks between 1989 and 2000 fell the most in metropolitan areas with the highest levels federally funded enforcement. It is impossible to know whether these enforcement actions reduced discrimination or just pushed discrimination until later in the rental process. Notes: The panel represent the groups being tested, the sample size is the number of tests for each group in each market, and the percent of PUMA's is the fraction of PUMAs that contain at least one test. Notes: The first panel present the results from the 2012 HDS report and the second panel present results that are representative of available rental housing. The column labeled Both contains the share of tests where equal treatment occurred, the column labeled by race or ethnicity represents either the fraction of tests in which that group was favored or the average of a continuous variable. The column labeled Difference is the difference in the preceding two columns, and the P-Value represents the statistical significance of this difference. Notes: The first panel present the results from the 2012 HDS report and the second panel present results that are representative of available rental housing. The column labeled Both contains the share of tests where equal treatment occurred, the column labeled by race or ethnicity represents either the fraction of tests in which that group was favored or the average of a continuous variable. The column labeled Difference is the difference in the preceding two columns, and the P-Value represents the statistical significance of this difference. Notes: The first panel present the results from the 2012 HDS report and the second panel present results that are representative of available rental housing. The column labeled Both contains the share of tests where equal treatment occurred, the column labeled by race or ethnicity represents either the fraction of tests in which that group was favored or the average of a continuous variable. The column labeled Difference is the difference in the preceding two columns, and the P-Value represents the statistical significance of this difference. Notes: The first panel presents the average of census tract attributes over all tests and various subsamples of tests weighted by either the original site weights and by the weights designed to represent the population of available rental housing. The second panel presents the average for the original weights divided by the average for the revised weights. Notes: The first panel presents the average of census tract attributes over all tests and various subsamples of tests weighted by either the original site weights and by the weights designed to represent the population of available owner-occupied housing. The second panel presents the average for the original weights divided by the average for the revised weights.
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